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Abstract 
In this paper we present six scenarios about the possible evolution of the water supply and sanitation 
sector in Europe, considering both liberalised and non-liberalised environments. The scenarios were 
developed around three macro-storylines, namely (1) pressure for more competition and private sector 
participation; (2) opposition to liberalisation and pressure to return to direct public or community 
management; and (3) maintenance of the status quo. We then define the institutional framework of 
each scenario taking into account the specificities of the sector. The institutional framework aims at 
illustrating the relative positioning and changing power attributes of the main actor groups. We 
conclude this institutional analysis of the scenarios by assessing their viability based on three criteria, in 
particular stability, efficiency and accountability. 
 
Table of content 
1. Introduction..................................................................................................................................1 
2. Scenarios on the evolution of the water sector ..........................................................................2 
2.1 Tendered market (scenario 1) ..............................................................................................3 
2.2 Tendered market with strong regulation (scenario 2) ..........................................................4 
2.3 Administrative regulation (scenario 3) ................................................................................4 
2.4 Outsourcing (scenario 4)......................................................................................................5 
2.5 Direct public management (scenario 5) ...............................................................................6 
2.6 Community management (scenario 6) .................................................................................7 
3. criteria and indicators .................................................................................................................7 
3.1 The stability criterion and its main indicators......................................................................7 
3.2 The efficiency criterion and its main indicators ..................................................................8 
3.3 The legitimacy criterion and its main indicators................................................................10 
4. Institutional implications of the scenarios ...............................................................................11 
4.1 Tendered market (scenario 1) ............................................................................................11 
4.2 Tendered market and strong regulation (scenario 2) .........................................................11 
4.3 Administrative regulation (scenario 3) ..............................................................................11 
4.4 Outsourcing (scenario 4)....................................................................................................12 
4.5 Direct public management (scenario 5) .............................................................................12 
4.6 Community management (scenario 6) ...............................................................................13 
5. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................13 
References .............................................................................................................................................14 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank all the partners of the European research project for their valuable 
input for this research (UNESCO-IHE : Meine Pieter von Dijk, Marco Schouten ; Université de Paris 
VIII : Pierre Bauby, Sylvie Lupton ; TU Delft : Aad Correljé, Delphine François ; ENGREF : Laetitia 
Guerin-Schneider, Serge Garcia, Lise Breuil ; University of Bocconi – IEFE : Antonio Massarutto, 
Massimi di Domenico, Vania Paccagnan, University of Birmingham – IDD : Andrew Nickson, David 
Musco ; Ecologic : Andreas Kraemer, Eduard Interwies, Britta Pielen, Nadine Herbke ; Université 
catholique de Louvain : Frederic Varone, David Aubin ; University of Zaragoza : Pedro Arrojo, Isabel 
Almudi). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
While other network industries such as telecommunications, electricity, and transport have undergone 
significant changes due to a European liberalisation process, the water sector has not been until now 
subject to the same rules regarding the European policy of liberalisation of services. The objective of 
this paper is to present six scenarios on the possible evolution of the water sector in the European 
Union (EU), considering both liberalised and non-liberalised environments, as well as their 
institutional implications.  
Before addressing these questions, it is important to define some basic concepts referred in this paper: 
(i) the water sector; (ii) scenario; (iii) liberalisation; and (iv) institutions.  
1. The water sector is restricted in the scope of this paper to water supply and sanitation 
(WSS) services, also called the artificial water cycle. WSS services are limited to the supply 
of drinking water and the collection and treatment of wastewater. It is focused on services 
for urban and rural uses. In particular, it excludes the transfers of raw waters over long 
distances and irrigation.  
2. The term scenario means internally coherent and credible stories about alternative futures 
(Euromarket, 2005a: 5).  
3. Liberalisation refers to a process by which competition is introduced in situations or sectors 
thus far characterised by monopolistic aspects. Its rationale lies on the recognition that, in 
principle, competition is more prone to achieve efficiency than monopoly. In general 
liberalisation leads to more Private Sector Participation (PSP).  
4. The concept of institutions is used in a broad sense and includes all relevant actors, and in 
particular the (formal and informal) rules and norms governing their relationships (Finger, 
2005: 275). Institutions are viewed as codified power structures that shape the behaviour of 
the actors involved. Simultaneously, actors may be capable of reshaping the institutions 
within which they operate by forming strategic alliances (Crozier, 1963). 
The identified scenarios are the result of a three-year research project named “Water Liberalisation 
Scenarios in Europe”, and which is funded by the European Commission 
(http://www.epfl.ch/mir/euromarket). They were developed considering both liberalised and non-
liberalised environments, and taking into account the specificities of the sector.  
It is generally agreed that the water sector displays the four following main characteristics:  
1. Nature of the good: merit and quasi-public good. It is a merit good because its social 
benefits exceed the private benefits given its (environment and public-health) externalities. 
Also, the important externalities and social objectives may, in practice, limit excludability. 
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Hence, when there is sufficient infrastructure capacity, water services are possibly 
transformed into a quasi-public good1 (Euromarket, 2003: 124). 
2. Natural monopoly: the fixed (largely sunk) costs represent up to 70% of the total supply 
costs for domestic uses (Gee, 2004: 38) and thus a single supplier tends to be more efficient 
than multiple, competing ones. The introduction of competition has therefore been limited 
to competition for the market. However, new ways to introduce other forms of competition 
are currently debated, whether via benchmarking or third party access (Gordon-Walker, 
2002: 46). 
3. Local nature: the high transport costs in relation to its market value make the water services 
local in nature. It has indeed been estimated that transport costs per 100 km represent about 
50% of the wholesale cost of water (as compared to 5 percent for electricity and 2.5 percent 
for gas) (Gee, 2004:38). 
4. Low elasticity of demand: the variability in demand resulting from a price change for 
primary uses of water is close to zero since these are essential needs of the user and few 
substitutes are available (Euromarket, 2003: 127).   
The paper is structured into three main parts. Firstly, chapter two presents the six scenarios identified 
in the project and the corresponding institutional frameworks. Secondly, chapter three identifies the 
three criteria and their indicators. And finally, chapter four focuses on the institutional implications of 
the scenarios.   
2. SCENARIOS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE WATER SECTOR 
The Euromarket project has identified and described six scenarios on the evolution of the water sector 
in Europe (table 1), which represent what is plausible but not necessarily what is either desirable or 
probable (Euromarket, 2005a: 10). 
Table 1: Scenarios on the evolution of the water sector in Europe. 
SCENARIOS 
Scenario 1 Tendered Market 
Scenario 2 Tendered Market with Strong Regulation 
Scenario 3 Administrative Regulation 
Scenario 4 Outsourcing 
Scenario 5 Direct Public Management 
Scenario 6 Community Management 
The scenarios were developed along three macro-storylines, namely: 
                                                     
1  Public goods display two particular characteristics: non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
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1. Pressure for more competition and private sector participation by a whole series of actors, 
such as public authorities, Directorate-General (DG) Competition, DG Internal Market, 
multi-utilities and other private operators (scenarios 1 and 2); 
2. Opposition to liberalisation and pressure to return to direct public or community 
management (scenarios 5 and 6); and 
3. Maintenance of the status quo as a result of the possibility that these two drivers cancel 
each other out (scenarios 3 and 4).  
The following sections provide a short description of each of these scenarios as applied in 2020 
(Euromarket, 2005a). The scenarios are described via story telling in order to develop plausible 
pathways from the current (i.e., 2005) to the future end states (that we call storylines). 
2.1 Tendered market (scenario 1) 
The first scenario is a tendered market scenario. The central features of this scenario are: 
1. Obligation to tender: competition for the market every 5 years; 
2. Least costly bid: obligation to retain the least costly bid. 
The major focus of this scenario is the consumer market although this has of course important knock 
on effects on the supplier market. Its main characteristic is the existence of strong competition, which 
is created through the shortening of the length of delegated management contracts. There is a 
compulsory bidding procedure organized every five year by the local public authority, as spelled out in 
a European Directive.  
The local public authority is thus obliged to retain the least costly bid. Due to the short length of the 
contracts, it is assumed that it is the local public authorities which are responsible for the major 
investments. The market is not unbundled; drinking water markets are integrated (extraction, 
treatment, transport, distribution, and customer service), as are sanitation markets. Most contracts take 
the form of delegated management contracts, mostly lease.  
Large private operators essentially dominate the European market. This can largely be explained by 
their considerable experience in this particular type of contracts but also by their very high 
technological expertise, their large financial capacity, as well as their management know-how. Small 
and medium-sized companies also remain in the European WSS market but these are slowly being 
taken over by the large ones.  
This scenario is the result of two main driving forces, namely the lobbying of trans-national 
corporations (TNCs), on the one hand, and the desire of the EU to introduce more competition in the 
sector, on the other. The large TNCs have gradually withdrawn their investments in developing 
countries and are now mostly focusing on the European market. At the EU level, following the 
elections in 2009, the EU Parliament and the Commission are more inclined to introduce more 
competition in the WSS. The main assumption in the storyline is that social resistance will be passive 
or rather not powerful enough to countervail the liberalization movement. 
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2.2 Tendered market with strong regulation (scenario 2) 
This scenario mainly focuses on the consumer market. Its central features are: 
1. Obligation to tender: regular opening of competition for the market; 
2. Long-term contracting (10 to 15 years); and 
3. Independent regulator: compulsory introduction of regulator. 
The legal basis setting the framework of the scenario is the European Directive that defines the 
obligation (1) to compete for the market every 10-15 years, and (2) to establish independent 
regulators. National contract law provides the detailed context. 
The public authority – local or regional - is the responsible entity for the service. The larger the 
responsible authority and its technical capabilities, the more balanced the bargaining power with the 
operator is. The scale of the responsible authority is not necessarily modelled on the scale of the 
service – for example the authority can be in charge of several services on different networks, and take 
advantage of this for setting a comparison process. 
The responsible authority remains the legal owner of the assets even if, in concession contracts, the 
infrastructure is financed and owned by the operator until the end of contract. The responsibility for 
investment depends on contractual arrangements between the authority and the operator.  
By means of the obligation to tender for delegating the service, there is the same mode of competition 
across all EU countries – competition for the market. Delegation contracts can take various forms but 
the most frequent are concession or lease contracts. The decision on the type of contract is taken by 
the public authority. 
Markets are not unbundled and they are mostly dominated by private operators. The firm operates the 
integrated service yet the scope may vary: water supply and/or sanitation services, and possibly other 
environmental network services.  
In terms of regulation, ex ante regulation (in order to choose the more efficient operator) is established 
by competitive bidding. Ex post regulation (in order to give incentives for best performance) is 
exercised by regulatory authorities that control price and quality (through performance indicators). 
The establishment of these authorities is compulsory, and they should be independent both from 
responsible authorities and public/private operators. 
2.3 Administrative regulation (scenario 3) 
The third scenario is an administrative regulation scenario. Its central features are: 
1. Benchmarking as the key competition process; and 
2. Diversity in the type of operators in Europe.  
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This scenario is characterized by benchmarking as the key competition process in the main monopoly 
markets. Benchmarking can take two polar forms. First high-powered benchmarking with centralized 
regulation (Pole A) is mainly applied under private monopolies that are subject to a strong external 
and independent regulating authority at central level, which is also in charge of conducting the 
benchmarking and of enforcing its results. On the basis of data and information compiled through the 
benchmarking process, the regulating authorities determines the tariffs, budgets, prices and 
investments that companies may charge or carry out. 
Second, medium-powered benchmarking with decentralized regulation (Pole B) prevails in those 
countries, where the organizational structure of the sector is characterized by maintained municipal 
influence. It comprises extensive information gathering and interrogation of practices by an 
independent benchmarking authority. Participation is compulsory for all operators. A summarized and 
condensed selection of this information is published, which exerts public pressure on companies. 
The storyline is characterised by pro and anti liberalisation forces cancelling each other out and by 
growing administrative intervention. The financial pressure on municipalities led either to the 
participation of the local private sector or to the creation of autonomous supra-local bodies. The 
financial pressure on operators has also increased due to the use of increasingly sophisticated 
monitoring equipment and new health/environment assessment techniques that identified an ever-
increasing range of new pollutants. Furthermore, the implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD) also highlighted the need for large investments in sanitation services. All these 
factors had therefore an important impact on water bills. Consumers, as well as the EU, therefore 
pushed for more transparency and it was in this regard that new benchmarking practices were 
introduced. 
2.4 Outsourcing (scenario 4) 
This scenario mainly focuses on the supplier market. Its central features are: 
1. The majority of operators outsource part of their tasks to external sub-contractors; 
2. Large variety of management models across Europe, ranging from direct public 
management to full divestiture. 
In the fourth scenario – called “outsourcing” – European operators have decided to outsource part of 
their tasks (from metering, via maintenance of the infrastructures, to the handling of the customers’ 
complaints) to external sub-contractors. A large variation developed in respect of the width of 
outsourcing contracts. Nevertheless, unlike under delegation contracts, revenue risks are generally not 
transferred to the winning bidder. 
Some of the member states have kept their water services under direct public management, other 
member states work with concessions to private operators, and other member states are mainly 
characterized by regulated monopolies. Whatever the differences of the current state of the WSS 
market may be, all have two underlying trends in common namely the drive to: efficiency and 
specialisation.  
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Outsourcing was seen as the major answer to the growing pressure of achieving greater efficiency and 
innovation, as a result of the growing investments needs in the sector (e.g., resulting from the WFD, 
increasing security concern) and the higher demands for specialisation. Outsourcing has thus come to 
be seen as a promising means to internalize scale and scope advantages via the use of sub-contractors, 
which serviced a number of operators and areas. 
Consultancies and subcontractors with a high expertise offer their services, in competition with each 
other. These firms show a tendency to concentrate, combining the different knowledge aspects in the 
field and reducing the number of players available. Competition authorities have their responsibility in 
fighting the potential oligopolist tendencies in the supplier market.  
The difference with the previous scenarios lies in the fact that there is some dissatisfaction with 
regulation (regulatory failure, cost of regulation) and that there is growing financial pressure to seek 
more efficient operations. 
2.5 Direct public management (scenario 5) 
The main features of the direct public management (DPM) scenario are: 
1. No competition apart from traditional procurement arrangements; 
2. Each operator acts as a local monopolist; and 
3. The ownership of the operator is exclusively public. 
The local operator is awarded the responsibility to provide the integrated water services to the 
community, i.e.: to operate as the only provider. Its focus is on the efficient provision of a high quality 
public service to the entire community. The public authority has the complete responsibility for the 
operation of the water services, for the investments, but also the relationships with the users. 
Contracting out is generally restricted to large turnkey (design and build) infrastructure provision and 
to the high technology domain. Competition for finance may also be obtained through bond markets.  
The most important actors in the sector are the customers and local authorities, which are both 
operators and regulators. There have been no EU liberalisation directives in the water sector. EU 
activity is restricted to the enforcement of public health and environment standards, as well as to non-
discriminative measures in procurement contracts.  
There is no (independent) regulatory authority. The protection of customers’ interests as well as the 
guarantee of adequate capacity investment is assured by public ownership and management of the 
network. Apart from environmental and drinking water quality issues, which are established at the 
river basin area, each operator acts as a regulator in its region. 
DPM is not strictly a return to the old public management model as it incorporates various innovations 
in technology and in management structures (e.g., more flexible accounting standards, flexibility in 
work contracts). Moreover, public water operators have modernised their governance structures in 
order to increase public participation in water management. There are no direct subsidies, except for 
infrastructure development in isolated and less developed regions. In compliance with the WFD, full 
cost recovery is implemented. 
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2.6 Community management (scenario 6) 
The sixth scenario is a community management scenario. Its main characterising features are: 
1. Communities of interest own and manage the infrastructure; and 
2. No competition in/for the customer market. 
Communities of interest – e.g., local communities, agglomerations, users groups, associations of 
industry and private users – retain strategic control over the entire water system, as well as decide the 
service level and the corresponding investments.  
The local community does not forcibly operate the whole integrated services. Normally, sanitation 
services are managed by individuals (i.e., septic tanks) but new technologies enable some communities 
to set up a decentralised system for wastewater. Regarding the operation and maintenance of WSS, 
there are two alternatives: the community may be involved in the day-to-day operation and 
maintenance or it can delegate this task or some other aspects to a professional. In some rare cases, the 
operation and maintenance is based on voluntary work. Contracting out is generally restricted to 
infrastructure provision or for technological expertise demanding tasks. 
The institutional arrangements for this particular scenario may vary from voluntary organizations (e.g., 
user cooperatives) to water management associations formed by landowners, private enterprises or 
public corporations. Customers may also own water asset or can contribute to the WSS management 
through representation in water company boards. Public participation is surely the main distinctive 
element of this scenario. 
Community management differs from the public management model in the sense that the community 
participation includes ownership of the services, cost sharing, operation and maintenance of WSS. It 
helps to decentralise decisions concerning water services management, by transferring responsibilities 
to communities. It can be a way for an effective water management when centralised water provision 
is not efficient. It can also result from a crisis in public finance, mistrust in the public authorities as 
managers of water infrastructures, and it is possible because new technological developments allow 
for a more decentralised water production and treatment. 
3. CRITERIA AND INDICATORS 
The institutional implications of the scenarios are assessed on the basis of a set of criteria – stability, 
efficiency and legitimacy – derived from organisational, transaction cost, and governance theories. 
The following sections derive these criteria and define the corresponding indicators (based on 
Euromarket, 2005b).   
3.1 The stability criterion and its main indicators 
The institutional framework of the water sector is considered a dynamic system of organisations that 
differ in terms of goals and which operate in changing environments. Each scenario hence corresponds 
to a specific set of organisations operating within a defined institutional framework, which is prone to 
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be affected by change. In the specific case of the WSS sector, changes in the environment might stem 
from liberalisation pressures, water-related policies (e.g., stricter environmental standards), financial 
pressures, as well as ideological shifts. The environmental changes affect primarily the rules (i.e., 
institutions), yet via the rules the actors and their strategies are also affected.  
If we are interested in analysing the institutional implications for the scenarios, stability emerges as an 
important criterion. The stability of the scenario pertains to the sustainability of its institutional 
framework in a context where organisations under permanent power struggles might redefine priorities 
and strategies and possibly, as a consequence, the rules of the game. 
For practical reasons, we have derived from organisational theories the following indicators to assess 
the stability criterion: coherence, balance of power and conflict resolution. 
Coherence: Coherence pertains to the definition and allocation of the institutional functions, which 
means organisational separation of institutional functions. It is important that institutional functions do 
not overlap. For example, policy making, regulatory and operational functions should be distinguished 
and clearly defined. Moreover, operational and regulatory functions should not be dependent upon 
political interference. And finally, operational functions should be dependent upon the respect of the 
regulatory framework; and separated from political direction and control.  
Balance of power: The WSS sector is a dynamic system of organisations that differ in terms of goals. 
It is therefore important to analyse for each scenario whether there are organisations that enjoy 
considerable discretion and protection from possible interventions which enables them to look after 
their own interests. In each of the three markets considered in the institutional framework (i.e., 
customer, supplier and resources markets), the study looks if there is one (or more) actor(s) more 
powerful than the others. A balanced system of power means that each organisation responsible for 
specific institutional functions in the system is checked by the others, so that one organisation is not 
the final arbiter of all powers.  
Conflict resolution mechanisms: In the context of changing environments, organisations must adapt 
and change, which is likely to lead to a redefinition of priorities and (eventually) goals, as well as to a 
redistribution of resources. As a matter of fact, change affects the power relationships among the 
actors, and consequently it threatens the status of some actors. There is therefore a strong need to 
manage potential ruptures and crises (e.g., in the cases there is a new mission to pursue). We check for 
each actor/organisation which are (if any) the existent mechanisms to solve conflicts of interest with 
other actors/organisations.  
3.2 The efficiency criterion and its main indicators2 
Institutions seek to achieve efficiency – minimising comprehensive cost – inclusive of both production 
and transaction costs. The efficacy of economic institutions should be judged on a systemic basis 
considering both ex ante and ex post transaction arrangements. 
                                                     
2  The content of this section is based on a chapter written by David Musco in Euromarket (2005b). 
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To develop a complete set of efficiency indicators to evaluate the scenarios, we have focused on two 
levels: the nature of individual transactions (within our institutional framework), and the nature of the 
generic institutions of governance. The indicators are: level of transaction costs, adaptability and 
incentives to perform. 
Level of transaction costs: In a general view, transaction costs relate to both motivation (to align 
actors’ interests) and coordination (of agents’ actions) costs. Governance is an exercise in assessing 
the efficacy of alternative modes of organisation – namely Markets, Hybrids and Hierarchies – to 
economise on transaction costs (Williamson, 2005: 35). Hence hierarchies (e.g., public/private/social 
enterprises), Hybrids (e.g., delegation contracts) and Markets are alternative forms of organisation for 
managing the very same transaction. 
In order to characterise the transactions according to their information problems/contracting hazards, 
one needs to focus on each individual transactions (e.g., between customer and operator; between 
customer and responsible body; between responsible body and regulatory body). The key information 
problems associated to transaction costs have been grouped into: 
I1. Information asymmetry: creates adverse selection (leading to signalling/screening costs); 
I2. Non observability of agents’ action: creates a moral hazard (leading to costs of monitoring 
and incentive/penalty schemes); 
I3. Non verifiability of information (leading to audit costs/costs due to misrepresentation when 
audit too costly); 
I4. Information uncertainty: creates the need for incomplete contracts (leading to complex 
contract construction, negotiation, monitoring/ renegotiation and dispute resolution costs). 
Adaptability: Uncertainty increases the frequency of adaptation.  In the discrete governance forms, 
market and hybrid governance represent two polar types of adaptability (Williamson, 1991: 280).  
Market governance supports high exit flexibility and low idiosyncratic investments adaptation, i.e. 
autonomy, whereas hybrid governance supports high modification flexibility and high idiosyncratic 
investments adaptability, i.e. cooperation.   
Incentives to perform: According to Williamson (2000: 599), a governance structure reshapes 
incentives (ex ante and especially ex post incentives). The academic literature argues that well-
designed and well-implemented market-based instruments generate high-powered incentives to 
perform and require limited administrative controls. On the other hand, command-and-control 
instruments are frequently criticized because of their high administrative costs and low-powered 
incentives. 
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3.3 The legitimacy criterion and its main indicators3 
In the context of this paper, legitimacy of an institutional arrangement is not necessarily political 
regime legitimacy, but rather the "legitimacy of specific structures and procedures through which 
policy is being produced" (Scharpf 1997: 14). This means the "general capacity of particular policy-
making institutions to produce policy choices that are likely to approximate the common good" 
(Scharpf 1997: 15). Legitimacy can be regarded along two ways: (1) input-oriented: legitimacy derives 
from the agreement of those who asked to comply; and (2) output-oriented: it refers to substantive 
criteria of buon governo, in the sense that effective policies can claim legitimacy if they serve the 
common good and conform to criteria of distributive justice.  
Good governance can be regarded as a source of legitimacy. According to the Commission’s white 
book on good governance (European Commission 2001: 8), “governance means rules, processes and 
behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” (considered as principles).  
The two first principles concern the input-oriented legitimacy of public management, which depends 
on process openness and public participation (democracy understood as government by the people). In 
contrast, the three other principles focus more on output-oriented legitimacy (democracy understood 
as government for the people). In our assessment, two over the three indicators related to output-
oriented legitimacy are already retained in the proposed assessment criteria of stability and efficiency, 
respectively coherence and effectiveness. As such, we chose to build the criteria of legitimacy on the 
three remaining indicators, one output-oriented (accountability) and two input-oriented (openness and 
participation). 
Openness: In order to reach good governance, organisations among the institutional arrangement 
should work in an open and transparent way. The broad public should have access to reliable 
information and be able to scrutinize the decision-making process. Such openness requires active 
communication and information provided in accessible language. An active communication implies 
the availability of detailed information to the public and access to working documents and final 
decisions. It also means that citizens are aware of the procedures and can locate at any time which step 
the decision-making process has reached and the periods within which they can intervene (e.g. time 
schedules of the consultation processes). In addition, available information should be adapted to local 
preoccupations and needs. 
Participation: The process should be formally institutionalised at all steps of decision-making and at 
two levels. First, participation must involve experts according to clear and transparent mechanisms 
within each organisation. Second, participation should be opened to the broad public. In addition, the 
range of participation goes from consultation to co-decision. We consider that a decision-making 
process is participatory if there is at least a consultation of the interested parties and the broad public. 
Accountability: the respective roles of organizations in the decision-making and implementation 
processes need to be clear. Each of the organizations on the institutional framework must explain and 
take responsibility for what it does at whatever level. 
                                                     
3  The content of this section is based on a chapter written by David Aubin in Euromarket (2005b). 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCENARIOS 
The present chapter presents the institutional implications of each scenario on the basis of the criteria 
and indicators identified above. The results presented are organised in terms of the strong features and 
main challenges of each end state. These results are based on a more comprehensive analysis detailed 
in Euromarket (2005b), and which has included illustrative case studies. 
4.1 Tendered market (scenario 1) 
In institutional and organisational terms, one can see that the major advantage of the tendered market 
scenario is its relative stability and, more importantly, its efficiency. Transaction costs are relatively 
small because transactions are mainly organised in the market through competitive bids. Moreover, the 
short length of contracts increases the flexibility of the framework and creates incentives to perform. 
The major challenge clearly concerns the low level of public participation but participation could be 
increased if the local public authority decides to involve the different stakeholders and, in particular, 
consumers in the planning of long term investment for the sustainability and improvement of the water 
supply and sanitation system as a whole.  
4.2 Tendered market and strong regulation (scenario 2) 
In general, the strong features of the tendered market and strong regulation scenario pertain to its high 
levels of efficiency and stability. The level of efficiency is related to high levels of adaptability of the 
framework and especially to incentives to perform. These incentives come on the one hand from 
regular tendering processes (i.e., competition for the market) and on the other from regulation (e.g., 
price-cap mechanisms and benchmarking). As stability is concerned, the main strengths of this 
institutional framework come from the balance of powers between actors and the existence of conflict 
resolution mechanisms. 
The main challenges of this institutional framework relate to the potential incoherencies arising from 
the overlap of responsibilities between the public authority (negotiating and signing party to the 
contract) and the regulatory entity. It is very important that the legal framework clearly allocates roles 
and responsibilities between the different actors, and that the corresponding level of resources is made 
available to properly execute the allocated functions (e.g., human and financial resources to the 
independent regulator). It is also very important to minimise transaction costs because the high 
number of actors involved in the framework may raise them to costly levels to society. These costs 
should be internalised by the system through their allocation to the actors that are better positioned to 
cope (and minimise) them. Finally, one must mention the need to improve public participation 
throughout all the chain in the institutional framework, in order to improve its legitimacy.  
4.3 Administrative regulation (scenario 3) 
The fact that the administrative regulation scenario can encompass multiple configurations (e.g., 
diversity of types of operators) limit the assessment of the scenario in terms of stability, efficiency and 
legitimacy because some of these criteria depend on the local context. We have nonetheless tried to 
identify some qualities and challenges. 
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One of the main features of this scenario is that bureaucracy costs are limited thanks to specialised 
agencies. Suppliers are oriented towards performance and constantly improve their management and 
practises (not only the financial ones). Efficiency is set as a priority in the sector management. The 
public benefits from a great openness and participation, notably a very high level of openness 
(information available to the public).  
The main challenge pertains to the fact that accountability goes through binding benchmarks organised 
by public bodies, not necessarily fully independent. Accountability rules must be specified in the law 
(clear objectives, indicators of performance of public companies, liability vis-à-vis a public authority). 
Public control through shareholding is not sufficient. Also, procedures of conflict resolution must be 
set for the different relationships between organisations belonging to the WSS sector. Citizens' 
involvement can be improved, beyond information dissemination. 
4.4 Outsourcing (scenario 4) 
The conclusion taken in this section in terms of stability, efficiency and legitimacy are mainly related 
to the supplier market and cannot be extrapolated to the entire institutional framework. This is because 
the outsourcing scenario was constructed in such a way that it can coincide with several organisational 
structures that are characteristic of other scenarios. In this sense, the exhaustive assessment of the 
institutional framework depends on the knowledge of local cases. One nonetheless presents 
conclusions iterated exclusively from outsourcing-based relationships. 
In general terms, high levels of efficiency are the main quality of this scenario. A competitive supplier 
market creates high incentives to perform, which can still be increased by the wording of the contracts. 
Moreover, short term contracts make the framework rather flexible to accommodate changes. The 
scenario is also considered as relatively stable, especially due to a clear definition of functions and 
roles as well as defined conflict resolution mechanisms in the supplier market. 
Its main challenge relates to the possibility that competition in the supplier market is constrained due 
to a tendency of outsourced firms to concentrate. The competition authority must pay special attention 
to such oligopolistic trends. The restriction of competition in the supplier market has important 
consequences in terms of the incentives to perform. There is also the problem related to the loss of 
internal competencies of the operator and its consequent dependency on a limited number of 
outsourced firms. This may lead to the capture of the operator. In such a context, both the flexibility as 
well as the incentives to perform would decrease.     
4.5 Direct public management (scenario 5) 
The main qualities of the direct public management scenario pertain to the fact that these systems are 
built on a strong legitimacy. In each case, suppliers are accountable to local authorities with a more or 
less important degree of public involvement and participation. Mostly, legitimacy comes from the 
dominant position of the local authorities which at the same time control the supplier (formally, at 
least) and are accountable to the voters/customers (at least through elections). 
The main challenge of this scenarios is to make sure operators are accountable to the local authorities 
(e.g. through the establishment of management contracts between the suppliers and the authority). 
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Also, the technical expertise of the local and upper level administration should be high in order to 
conduct an effective monitoring of the operator's activities, particularly in terms of cost of the service. 
The balance of powers between the dominant actors of the sector might be weakened by the operators' 
monopoly on technical expertise. Suppliers may be used to advise the local and regional decision-
makers and regulators and be tempted to retain information or hide issues that infringe their particular 
interests. In addition, it could be useful to develop incentives for the suppliers and their managers, not 
necessarily focusing on financial incentives, but including more qualitative preoccupations in terms of 
environmental protection, social equity, and quality of the service. 
4.6 Community management (scenario 6) 
The fact that the community management scenario can encompasses multiple forms of the social 
enterprise (e.g., cooperative, mutual) limit the assessment of the scenario especially in terms of 
stability and efficiency. We have nonetheless tried to identify some qualities and challenges that may 
be generalised to the end state. 
The strong feature of this scenario is that it is characterised by high levels of legitimacy. With certain 
caveats it also has good stability characteristics and can, with the introduction of appropriate 
mechanisms, develop reasonable levels of efficiency. Social enterprises therefore offer an interesting 
and viable alternative to public and private enterprises in the provision of water services. 
The main challenges relate to the fact that transaction costs are generally important and should 
therefore not be neglected. Also, for individual small social enterprises stability may be undermined 
by the exit of active members.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The scenarios on the evolution of the water sector in Europe presented in the paper can overlap. This 
is especially the case of Outsourcing and Administrative Regulation scenarios, whose competition 
processes may coincide with different forms of organising the sector. This has rendered difficult the 
assessment of their institutional consequences because they ultimately depend on the chosen 
organisation of the sector. 
In terms of the storylines4, there are strong similarities between Outsourcing and Administrative 
Regulation (which focus on links outside the operator circle) and between Tendered Markets and 
Direct Public Management (mainly built within the operator circle). We have therefore decided to 
compare these scenarios together. 
On the one hand, it is interesting to first look at the Outsourcing and Administrative Regulation 
together because these two scenarios can occur with a mixture of operator types. The strong features 
of these scenarios pertain to the high levels of incentives to perform, created by the competition level 
in supplier market in Outsourcing and benchmarking in Administrative Regulation. Their main 
                                                     
4  For more details on the storyline, please refer to Euromarket (2005a). 
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challenges pertain: (1) in Outsourcing to the possibility that competition in the supplier market is 
constrained by a tendency of firms to concentrate, and to the loss of internal competencies of the 
operator; and (2) in Administrative Regulation to the fact that accountability depends on benchmarks 
organised by public bodies not necessarily fully independent, and to the low level of public 
participation. 
On the other hand, it is interesting to look at the Tendered Market (both scenario 1. and 2.) and Direct 
Public Management scenarios together because they are contrasting especially in the nature of the 
operators that predominate. These contrasting scenarios have necessarily different institutional 
implications. Firstly, the strong features of Tendered Market scenarios pertain to the efficiency and 
stability-related indicators, while in Direct Public Management they are related to strong legitimacy. 
Secondly, the main challenges of Tendered Market pertain to legitimacy, especially in what concerns 
public participation, while in Direct Public Management they pertain to the potential lack of 
incentives to perform. 
Finally, Community Management is possibly the most complex scenario in that it embraces both 
changes to the nature of the operator (from public/private enterprise to social enterprise) and 
associated adjustments in both the operator-supplier and operator-regulator relationship. The strong 
feature of this scenario is that it is characterised by high levels of legitimacy. The main challenge 
relate to the fact that transaction costs are generally high. 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the institutional implications of the different scenarios. The 
aim was not to make judgements on the scenarios neither to recommend any one in particular, but it 
was to assess them across a set of criteria including various indicators. The identified scenarios are 
theoretical constructions on the possible evolution of the water sector in Europe, which means that the 
organisation of the water sector and its consequences in 15 years’ time will as well depend on the 
specific characteristics of local systems. We mean by this that any of the conclusions presented in this 
report should not be extrapolated to all the situations. These conclusions pretend to improve the 
knowledge set of policy-making actors, namely calling their attention to important issues that are 
related to particular features of the scenarios.  
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